One-Way Ratchet and a Different Kind of Pastry: Trump Tariffs at the Supreme Court

Keith B. Letourneau ●

On November 5, 2025, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in the consolidated tariff cases. This article addresses a few notable points made during the argument and examines the underpinnings of each. On balance, it appears the Supreme Court will not uphold the reciprocal and fentanyl tariffs imposed by the president under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), though there are other more complicated means to a similar end. The Court’s decision is expected early this year.

Justice Barrett inquired of Solicitor General Sauer (“SG”) where there is any other place in the United States Code where the words “regulate importation” confer tariff-imposing authority. The SG noted it exists in the Trading with the Enemy Act (“TWEA”) as interpreted in Yoshida and IEEPA. In Yoshida, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held that President Nixon had the authority to impose a 10 percent import duty surcharge under TWEA’s authority to “regulate … importation.” Nevertheless, Yoshida made clear that each presidential proclamation must be evaluated on its own facts and circumstances. In that case, the measure issued under TWEA was temporary; it did not supplant the entire tariff scheme of Congress and did not apply to all imports, but only those imports already subject to tariffs. Yet, despite such limitations, the Yoshida court recognized that there was a broad grant of authority under TWEA, and said, “[t]hough such a broad grant may be considered unwise, or even dangerous, should it come into the hands of an unscrupulous, rampant president, willing to declare an emergency when none exists, the wisdom of a congressional delegation is not for us to decide.”

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The Supreme Court Rejects Punitive Damages in Unseaworthiness Claims

Keith B. Letourneau, William R. Bennett III, John D. Kimball, and Zachary J. Wyatte

A recent United States Supreme Court ruling held that a plaintiff may not recover punitive damages on a maritime claim of unseaworthiness. This new ruling has resolved a split among the circuits and has essentially reinforced an otherwise long-standing precedent.

On June 24, 2019, the United States Supreme Court decided Dutra Group v. Batterton, holding 6-3, that a plaintiff may not recover punitive damages on a claim of unseaworthiness. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Roberts, Thomas, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.

This case arose from a personal injury incident aboard a vessel. Christopher Batterton was working as a deckhand on the vessel, which The Dutra Group owned and operated, when a hatch cover blew open and severely injured his hand. Batterton sued Dutra, asserting a variety of claims, including unseaworthiness, and sought general and punitive damages. Dutra moved to dismiss the punitive damages claim, arguing that such damages were not available on claims for unseaworthiness. The District Court denied Dutra’s motion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. But the Supreme Court reversed.

The Court noted that the overwhelming historical evidence suggests that punitive damages are not available for unseaworthiness claims and that the lack of punitive damages in traditional maritime law cases is “practically dispositive.” The Court said, “because there is no historical basis for allowing punitive damages in unseaworthiness actions, and in order to promote uniformity with the way courts have applied parallel statutory causes of action, we hold that punitive damages remain unavailable in unseaworthiness actions.”

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The Supreme Court Adopts a Middle of the Road Approach When Deciding a Manufacturer’s Duty to Warn in the Context of Maritime Tort Asbestosis Cases

John D. Kimball and Noe S. Hamra

 

On March 19, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court in Air & Liquid Systems Corp. v. Devries held that, under maritime law, a product manufacturer has a duty to warn of asbestos or other hazardous parts when its own product, although not containing such hazardous parts, requires its later incorporation, and the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the integrated part is likely to be dangerous for its intended use. The Supreme Court’s decision settles a longstanding conflict between federal and state courts regarding the applicable rule in maritime tort cases. Manufacturers of such products must take this ruling into account when evaluating product warnings.

Background

For years, federal and state courts have struggled to find consensus on the applicable rule regarding a manufacturer’s duty to warn of the danger of its products when those products later had dangerous parts added to them. Prior to Devries, courts generally applied one of three approaches.

The first approach, viewed as plaintiff-friendly, relied on mere foreseeability. Under this approach, if it was foreseeable that the manufacturer’s product would be used with another product or part, even if the manufacturer’s product did not require use or incorporation of that other product or part, then the manufacturer could face liability for failure to warn.

The second approach, viewed as defendant-friendly, relieves manufacturers of any liability if they do not make, sell, or distribute the dangerous part or incorporate the dangerous part into the product, even if the product requires incorporation of the part and the manufacturer knows that the integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended use (this is also known as the “bare-metal defense”).

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