Category: Sanctions/Export Control

One-Way Ratchet and a Different Kind of Pastry: Trump Tariffs at the Supreme Court

Keith B. Letourneau ●

On November 5, 2025, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in the consolidated tariff cases. This article addresses a few notable points made during the argument and examines the underpinnings of each. On balance, it appears the Supreme Court will not uphold the reciprocal and fentanyl tariffs imposed by the president under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), though there are other more complicated means to a similar end. The Court’s decision is expected early this year.

Justice Barrett inquired of Solicitor General Sauer (“SG”) where there is any other place in the United States Code where the words “regulate importation” confer tariff-imposing authority. The SG noted it exists in the Trading with the Enemy Act (“TWEA”) as interpreted in Yoshida and IEEPA. In Yoshida, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held that President Nixon had the authority to impose a 10 percent import duty surcharge under TWEA’s authority to “regulate … importation.” Nevertheless, Yoshida made clear that each presidential proclamation must be evaluated on its own facts and circumstances. In that case, the measure issued under TWEA was temporary; it did not supplant the entire tariff scheme of Congress and did not apply to all imports, but only those imports already subject to tariffs. Yet, despite such limitations, the Yoshida court recognized that there was a broad grant of authority under TWEA, and said, “[t]hough such a broad grant may be considered unwise, or even dangerous, should it come into the hands of an unscrupulous, rampant president, willing to declare an emergency when none exists, the wisdom of a congressional delegation is not for us to decide.”

Continue reading “One-Way Ratchet and a Different Kind of Pastry: Trump Tariffs at the Supreme Court”

White House Announces Multiple Trade Deals Following President Trump’s Tour of Asia

Timothy J. Hruby, Alan G. Kashdan, Christopher A. Kimura, and Rachel D. Evans ●

In late October 2025, President Donald Trump embarked on a weeklong tour of Asia and returned having secured a temporary truce in the U.S.-China trade war, and a number of economic deals with Japan, South Korea, Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam.

These deals demonstrate not only a strengthening of trade and investment ties between the United States and Asia, but also underscore the need for companies to track diplomatic developments that may impact their supply chains, especially those for sensitive technologies and scarce resources.

Continue reading “White House Announces Multiple Trade Deals Following President Trump’s Tour of Asia”

The FMC Announces Investigation into Flags of Convenience and Unfavorable Conditions Created by Flagging Practices

Matthew J. Thomas, Jeanne M. Grasso, Kierstan L. Carlson, Natalie M. Radabaugh ●

The U.S. Federal Maritime Commission (“FMC”) announced on May 21, 2025 that it is initiating a non-adjudicatory investigation into whether the: 1) vessel flagging laws, regulations, and/or practices of certain foreign governments, including the so-called flags of convenience, or 2) competitive methods employed by owners, operators, agents, or masters of foreign-flag vessels, are creating unfavorable shipping conditions in the foreign trade of the United States.

The investigation includes a 90-day public comment period, which ends on August 20, 2025. 

FMC’s “Section 19” Trade Authority

Section 19 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. § 42101 et seq., authorizes the FMC to evaluate conditions that affect shipping in the U.S. foreign trade and to issue regulations or take action to address such conditions. Potential remedies include port fees up to one million dollars, limits on voyages to and from U.S. ports or the amount or type of cargo carried, and other trade restrictions.

The FMC exercised this authority frequently in the 1980s and 90s (before the sell-off of the major U.S. liner operators to foreign buyers) to force market-opening concessions and eliminate discriminatory fees and trade barriers that impeded U.S. shipping companies’ competitiveness overseas. However, these powers have been left nearly dormant for the past two decades.

The current investigation does not target particular flag States or propose any remedial measures; rather, it is a non-adjudicatory investigation pursuant to 46 C.F.R. Part 502, Subpart R, which allows the FMC to request information, conduct hearings, issue subpoenas, conduct depositions, and issue reports, at its discretion.

To read or download the full client alert, please visit our website.

New USTR Measures Target Chinese Maritime Sector: What You Need to Know

Matthew J. Thomas, Kathleen H. Shannon, Keith B. Letourneau, Douglas J. Shoemaker, Natalie M. Radabaugh, and Holli B. Packer ●

The Office of the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) issued a detailed notice on April 17, 2025, regarding actions and proposed actions in response to China’s alleged targeting of the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors for dominance. The measures, USTR argues, will “disincentivize the use of Chinese shipping and Chinese-built ships, thereby providing leverage on China to change its acts, policies, and practices, and send a critically needed demand signal for U.S.-built ships.” Below, we break down the key elements of the notice and their potential impacts. 

Background

The USTR launched an investigation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (“Trade Act”) following a petition received by five national labor unions on March 12, 2024. The petition alleged that China’s policies unfairly harm U.S. commerce by targeting dominance in critical maritime-related sectors. Following a review, USTR determined that these practices displace foreign firms, reduce opportunities for U.S. businesses, and weaken supply chain resilience due to dependencies on China’s controlled sectors. As a result, in the closing days of the Biden administration, USTR issued a determination that these actions are unreasonable and actionable under the Trade Act.

The investigation revealed that China’s dominance strategy restricts U.S. competition, undermines supply chain security, and creates vulnerabilities in critical economic sectors. In response, on February 21, 2025, the USTR issued a Federal Register notice proposing certain responsive actions, including service fees and restrictions on certain maritime transport services, which resulted in the USTR convening a two-day public hearing and receiving nearly 600 public comments from industry stakeholders. USTR published its determination on responsive actions on April 17, 2025, Notice of Action and Proposed Action in Section 301 Investigation of China’s Targeting the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance, Request for Comments. 

To read or download the full client alert, please visit our website.

Navigating the New Tariff Terrain: How Trump’s Latest Policies Impact Global Trade and Shipping

Matthew J. Thomas, Keith B. Letourneau, Douglas J. Shoemaker, and Holli B. Packer ●

President Donald Trump issued an Executive Order (“EO”) on April 2, 2025, titled Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices that Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits. This EO introduces significant changes to the tariff landscape, imposing unprecedented tariff increases on most U.S. trading partners, which will have far-reaching implications for global trade and shipping. Below, we break down the key elements of the new tariff policies and their potential impacts. 

Key Elements of the Executive Order

Global Tariff Implementation. The EO imposes a 10 percent global tariff on all imports into the United States, which became effective on April 5, 2025. For 57 countries identified in Annex I of the EO, an additional increase in tariffs for these countries was initially scheduled to take effect April 9, 2025, and has since been put on pause as negotiations take place, but that pause will not apply to sector tariffs. For additional information on the impact of the new tariffs announced in the April 2, 2025, EO, check out Blank Rome’s Recent Alert: Liberation Day: President Trump Unveils Global, Reciprocal Tariffs – What You Need to Know.

Product Exemptions. Annex II of the EO outlines various tariff exemptions, including certain mineral commodities, petroleum products, and pharmaceuticals. Among others, it also exempts items subject to Section 232 tariffs of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, including automobiles and automobile parts, and steel and aluminum goods, from both the global tariff and increased reciprocal tariffs. Goods from Canada and Mexico that meet the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (“USMCA”) requirements are also excluded from these tariffs. However, imports that fail to qualify for duty-free treatment under USMCA remain subject to the 25 percent tariffs introduced in March 2025 (10 percent for energy and potash) under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”).

End of De Minimis Exemption and Chinese Tariffs Generally. The EO ends the de minimis exemption for goods valued at less than $800 from China and Hong Kong, effective May 2, 2025. Following administration’s latest announcement on April 9, 2025, tariffs imposed on Chinese goods surged to 145 percent. (Click here for President Trump’s April 2 amendment to the de minimis EO on China.) China has responded with a 125 percent tariff on U.S. goods.

To read or download the full client alert, please visit our website.

USTR Seeks Public Comment on Proposed Action in Section 301 Investigation of China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors

Matthew J. Thomas, Kathleen H. Shannon, and Natalie M. Radabaugh ●


The Office of the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) announced its proposed actions under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (“Section 301”), in connection with its Investigation of China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance (the “Proposed Action”) on February 21, 2025. 

In short, the Proposed Action includes a variety of recommended remedies, including (1) imposing significant port fees on Chinese vessel operators and other operators of Chinese-built vessels, and operators with orders for new vessels being built in Chinese yards, and (2) implementing requirements for mandatory use of U.S.-flag and U.S.-built vessels to carry fixed percentages (increased annually) of U.S. exports. 

At this time, the Proposed Action is not final and USTR is seeking public comment by March 24, 2025, as discussed further below. Given the role that ocean transportation plays in the economy, the Proposed Action would have far-reaching effects to the extent it is adopted. Accordingly, vessel owners and operators and other interested parties in the industry should consider commenting on the Proposed Action and/or appearing at the upcoming hearing with respect to how the Proposed Action may affect them and their industry. In addition, at a minimum, shipowners, operators, charterers, and shippers should start considering their operations, contracts, and how the Proposed Action may affect them. 

To read or download the full client alert, please visit our website.

BIMCO Adopts New Clauses and Contracts

Keith B. Letourneau, Matthew J. Thomas, and Zachary J. Wyatte






New Development

The Baltic and International Maritime Council’s (“BIMCO”) Documentary Committee adopted several new clauses and contracts at its recent meeting held on January 25, 2021. Included were: (1) a new charter sanctions clause, (2) a clause promoting transparency and dialogue between owners and charterers, and (3) tug, barge, and floating hotel contracts. Given the prevalence of U.S. sanctions against myriad governmental and private-party actors worldwide, the scourge of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the construction advent of new offshore wind farm structures, each of these clauses and contracts warrant consideration by maritime law practitioners and commercial operators alike.

Sanctions Clause for Container Vessel Time Charter Parties 2021

In recognizing the complexity of international sanctions regimes, coupled with the fact that they consistently change as the number of new restrictions continues to increase, BIMCO issued a sanctions clause for charter parties in the container trade in an effort to assist interested parties in complying with the worldwide sanctions regulations. This new clause was designed as part of an initiative to create a library of sanctions clauses that reflect the individual needs and characteristics of different trades and operations, as well as provide greater understanding of the responsibilities assumed by owners. It is the last step in a triad of sanctions clause updates, which comes more than a year after BIMCO’s revised standard sanctions clauses for time and voyage charters. As the various shipping subsectors possess separate risks associated with different market realities, BIMCO tailored this clause to address the characteristics of the container industry, specifically to address: (1) transactions with a “Sanctioned Party,” and (2) voyages involving a “Sanctioned Cargo.”

Please click here for the full client alert.

Protecting the Supply Chain: U.S. Government Studies the Role of Federal Agencies in Ocean Carrier Bankruptcies

Rick Antonoff and Evan Jason Zucker

In December 2018, the Frank LoBiondo Coast Guard Authorization Act (the “LoBiondo Act”) was enacted to, among other things, improve and support the operation and administration of the Coast Guard and update maritime and environmental policy. Section 713 of the LoBiondo Act directs the Comptroller General of the United States to “conduct a study that examines the immediate aftermath of a major ocean carrier bankruptcy and its impact through the supply chain.” In accordance with that mandate, in January 2020, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) published a report on the role of the Federal Maritime Commission (the “FMC”) and Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) in an ocean carrier’s bankruptcy case.

The study was prompted by supply chain disruption at sea and at numerous ports caused by the bankruptcy of Hanjin Shipping Co., Ltd. in August 2016. At the time, Hanjin was one of the world’s largest integrated logistics and container shipping companies transporting cargo to and from ports throughout the world. The GAO concluded that the FMC and Commerce played an important monitoring function in the industry, but did not recommend any changes to either agency’s role in an ocean carrier bankruptcy. This is because the GAO found that industry participants have already taken steps to mitigate the effects of another ocean carrier bankruptcy and current law does not authorize these agencies to have a more active role.

The Ocean Carrier Industry

The maritime transport industry is the backbone of globalized trade and the manufacturing supply chain. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s Review of Maritime Transport 2019, more than four-fifths of world merchandise trade by volume is carried by sea. Annually, more than one trillion dollars in U.S. exports and imports are moved by ocean vessels. Prior to the current pandemic, the industry was already coping with low-freight rates, reduced earnings, and oversupply as a result of increased global tariffs, volatility in demand, and new environmental regulations. These market conditions have led to the continued consolidation of ocean carriers. “In February 2019, the [top] 10 deep-sea container-shipping lines represented 90 per cent of deployed capacity and dominated the major East-West trade routes through three alliances.” This consolidation in the industry increases the risk of disruption that the financial instability of any one shipping company can have on the global supply chain.

Scope of the GAO Study

To address the objectives mandated in the LoBiondo Act, the GAO reviewed documents filed in Hanjin’s bankruptcy case and documents provided by the FMC and Commerce. Additionally, the GAO interviewed 15 industry stakeholders representing various roles in the supply chain including representatives from four ports, two ocean carriers, one association representing carriers, one association representing freight forwarders and customs brokers, five associations or companies representing transportation and equipment providers, one association representing retailers, one association representing agricultural cargo owners, and officials with the FMC and Commerce. Continue Reading

Understanding the U.S. Anti-Boycott Provisions

Mainbrace | June 2017 (No. 3)

George T. Boggs and Stefanos A. Roulakis

Question: I have to certify that my subsidiary that owns a vessel is not on the Arab League’s boycott blacklist. Can I do that?

Answer: If you are subject to the U.S. anti-boycott rules, the answer is “no,” but your subsidiary can provide the certification for itself. This is discussed more fully below.

A frequent issue that vessels and cargo bound for ports in the Middle East encounter is compliance with U.S. anti-boycott provisions. The issue may also arise in connection with restrictions in charter agreements for vessels. These provisions provide that a U.S. person engaged in almost any type of commerce cannot comply with or support an unsanctioned foreign boycott. These anti-boycott provisions were promulgated in response to the Arab League’s boycott of Israel, which remains the primary focus of the U.S. anti-boycott regulations. To avoid penalties, persons that trade with or in countries with a non-sanctioned boycott, such as the Arab League’s boycott of Israel, should familiarize themselves with the requirements of U.S. law.

Continue reading “Understanding the U.S. Anti-Boycott Provisions”

U.S. Export Controls Pose Risks for Offshore Energy Companies’ Return in Iran

Mainbrace | June 2016 (No. 3)

Matthew J. Thomas

In March, Blank Rome co-hosted a breakfast seminar in Dubai with Fichte & Co Legal Consultancy to discuss with local shipping and energy professionals the real risks and opportunities presented by the rollback of international sanctions on Iran. We were awed by the warm reception we received, the huge turnout (well over 250 clients and friends), and by the insightful questions and contributions of those who joined us. Continue reading “U.S. Export Controls Pose Risks for Offshore Energy Companies’ Return in Iran”