tariffs Archives - Mainbrace

One-Way Ratchet and a Different Kind of Pastry: Trump Tariffs at the Supreme Court

On November 5, 2025, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in the consolidated tariff cases. This article addresses a few notable points made during the argument and examines the underpinnings of each. On balance, it appears the Supreme Court will not uphold the reciprocal and fentanyl tariffs imposed by the president under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), though there are other more complicated means to a similar end. The Court’s decision is expected early this year.

Justice Barrett inquired of Solicitor General Sauer (“SG”) where there is any other place in the United States Code where the words “regulate importation” confer tariff-imposing authority. The SG noted it exists in the Trading with the Enemy Act (“TWEA”) as interpreted in Yoshida and IEEPA. In Yoshida, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held that President Nixon had the authority to impose a 10 percent import duty surcharge under TWEA’s authority to “regulate … importation.” Nevertheless, Yoshida made clear that each presidential proclamation must be evaluated on its own facts and circumstances. In that case, the measure issued under TWEA was temporary; it did not supplant the entire tariff scheme of Congress and did not apply to all imports, but only those imports already subject to tariffs. Yet, despite such limitations, the Yoshida court recognized that there was a broad grant of authority under TWEA, and said, “[t]hough such a broad grant may be considered unwise, or even dangerous, should it come into the hands of an unscrupulous, rampant president, willing to declare an emergency when none exists, the wisdom of a congressional delegation is not for us to decide.”

White House Announces Multiple Trade Deals Following President Trump’s Tour of Asia

Timothy J. Hruby, Alan G. Kashdan, Christopher A. Kimura, and Rachel D. Evans ●

In late October 2025, President Donald Trump embarked on a weeklong tour of Asia and returned having secured a temporary truce in the U.S.-China trade war, and a number of economic deals with Japan, South Korea, Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam.

These deals demonstrate not only a strengthening of trade and investment ties between the United States and Asia, but also underscore the need for companies to track diplomatic developments that may impact their supply chains, especially those for sensitive technologies and scarce resources.

V.O.S. Selections, Inc. and the Sword of Yoshida

By way of executive order, the Trump administration has imposed tariffs on its global trading partners under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), which gives the president powers to deal with national emergencies stemming from “any unusual and extraordinary threat” that comes in whole or in large part from outside the United States. The tariffs have taken two forms: targeted tariffs against China, Mexico, and Canada relating to the importation of illegal narcotics (fentanyl) into the United States (though little evidence supports any such importation from Canada); and so-called “Reciprocal Tariffs” pertaining to perceived trade imbalances, which have been implemented as of August 7, 2025, against nearly all countries with any significant trade relationship with the United States, except as otherwise negotiated through bilateral trade deals with individual nations.

In V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United States, the Court of International Trade (“CIT”) combined challenges from various shipping importers and 12 states arguing that these tariffs are unconstitutional and violative of U.S. law, and that such tariffs require congressional approval. On May 28, 2025, the CIT ruled that IEEPA’s statutory authority for the president to “regulate . . . importation” does not extend to imposing unlimited tariffs under the Supreme Court’s major questions doctrine, which limits federal agencies from broadly construing their powers from vague or implied grants of authority, or the Trade Act, which limits tariffs imposed to respond to balance of payment problems to 15 percent and a maximum duration of 150 days. These tariffs also require an extensive investigation by the U.S. Trade Representative before implementation, which has not occurred. The CIT also ruled that Congress cannot delegate such unlimited power under the Constitution, which assigns Congress the exclusive powers to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,” and to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.” Quoting Supreme Court precedent addressing the nondelegation doctrine, the CIT noted that delegation of such authority, of course, is permitted “as long as Congress ‘lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise that authority] is directed to conform,’” which means when Congress “meaningfully constrains” the president’s authority.

Navigating Uncertainty: How Recent IEEPA Tariff Rulings Impact the Maritime Industry

Keith B. Letourneau and Holli B. Packer ●

On May 28, 2025, the United States Court of International Trade (“CIT”) issued a landmark decision in V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United States,[1] holding that tariffs imposed by the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) exceeded the statutory authority granted by Congress. The CIT vacated the challenged tariff orders and permanently enjoined their enforcement nationwide. However, less than 24 hours later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit temporarily stayed the CIT’s order, preserving the tariffs while the government’s appeal is pending. A separate decision from the D.C. District Court also found the President’s IEEPA tariffs to be beyond the scope of the statute, though it imposed a more limited injunction.[2]

The CIT’s decision is significant for the maritime industry, as it directly challenges the President’s ability to impose broad, unbounded tariffs on imports under IEEPA. The CIT emphasized that IEEPA does not grant the President unlimited authority to regulate importation through tariffs, and that any such delegation of power must be clearly limited and guided by statutory principles. The CIT found that the tariffs in question—ranging from a 10 percent rate on all imports to higher, country-specific duties—were not sufficiently tied to the “unusual and extraordinary threat” required by IEEPA and lacked meaningful limitations in scope or duration.

Navigating the New Tariff Terrain: How Trump’s Latest Policies Impact Global Trade and Shipping

Matthew J. Thomas, Keith B. Letourneau, Douglas J. Shoemaker, and Holli B. Packer ●

President Donald Trump issued an Executive Order (“EO”) on April 2, 2025, titled Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices that Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits. This EO introduces significant changes to the tariff landscape, imposing unprecedented tariff increases on most U.S. trading partners, which will have far-reaching implications for global trade and shipping. Below, we break down the key elements of the new tariff policies and their potential impacts.

Key Elements of the Executive Order

Global Tariff Implementation. The EO imposes a 10 percent global tariff on all imports into the United States, which became effective on April 5, 2025. For 57 countries identified in Annex I of the EO, an additional increase in tariffs for these countries was initially scheduled to take effect April 9, 2025, and has since been put on pause as negotiations take place, but that pause will not apply to sector tariffs. For additional information on the impact of the new tariffs announced in the April 2, 2025, EO, check out Blank Rome’s Recent Alert: Liberation Day: President Trump Unveils Global, Reciprocal Tariffs – What You Need to Know.

Product Exemptions. Annex II of the EO outlines various tariff exemptions, including certain mineral commodities, petroleum products, and pharmaceuticals. Among others, it also exempts items subject to Section 232 tariffs of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, including automobiles and automobile parts, and steel and aluminum goods, from both the global tariff and increased reciprocal tariffs. Goods from Canada and Mexico that meet the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (“USMCA”) requirements are also excluded from these tariffs. However, imports that fail to qualify for duty-free treatment under USMCA remain subject to the 25 percent tariffs introduced in March 2025 (10 percent for energy and potash) under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”).

End of De Minimis Exemption and Chinese Tariffs Generally. The EO ends the de minimis exemption for goods valued at less than $800 from China and Hong Kong, effective May 2, 2025. Following administration’s latest announcement on April 9, 2025, tariffs imposed on Chinese goods surged to 145 percent. (Click here for President Trump’s April 2 amendment to the de minimis EO on China.) China has responded with a 125 percent tariff on U.S. goods.

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